Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Corps' capstone concept for the early twenty-first century.
As the reduction of overseas bases and the lack of host nation support continue to place limitations on future U.S.
operations, the Marine Corps' ability to operate from the sea in order to secure ports and airfields for follow-on forces will become increasing important to the regional combatant commanders.
The Marines Corps' vision for future EMW at the operational level of warfare is known as Operational
Maneuver From the Sea (MCDP 3, 89) . Maneuver forces will move directly from the ship to objectives with a minimal footprint. The majority of firepower, to include aviation, will remain afloat and only go ashore if necessary. The advance weapons systems that enemies will posses will require that units be hard to detect, far-ranging, and fast moving (MCDP 3, 89) . The STOVL JSF is the Marine Corps'
answer to sea-based indirect and combined arms fires that is hard to detect, far ranging, and fast moving. 
THE THREAT
In the last thirty years U.S. air power has operated in environments where air assets have been relatively unchallenged in their ability to gain access to desired targets. This is mainly due to the fact that to date the U.S. has faced only first-generation Soviet-made Surfaceto-Air Missiles (SAMs) have successfully developed tactics and equipment to suppress them (Hudson 32) . Current SAM technology, and the far more capable systems that will follow, pose a significant threat to future employment of U.S. air power. These advanced SAM systems are mutually supporting, fully mobile, and are equipped with the latest electronic counter-countermeasure techniques (Hudson, 33) .
Of the estimated twenty-five first generation mobile SA-6 systems used by the Serbs in the 1999 Kosovo Air Campaign, it is unclear if any were found and destroyed (Zaloga, 49) . The ability to employ air power on a battlefield littered with hard to locate, and very capable advanced mobile SAMs, as well as ground units with advanced man-portable SAMs lies in the development of low observable fighter attack aircraft. Like all things in tactical aviation, nothing comes without a price, and the price of low observable is reduced fuel and ordnance capacity. In order to reduce the JSF's radar cross-section to a state of low observable will require all it to be carried internally. The JSF will still be able to carry external stores, but it will increase the aircraft's radar crosssection and reduce its maneuverability to a point, which would dramatically reduce its survivability in a high threat environment. (Killea) .
STOVL JSF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
INCREASING TACTICAL CAPABILITIES
In order to allow the STOVL JSF to take full tactical advantage of its VLBB capabilities, it would have to be produced with the same bomb bay doors as the conventional take off and landing (CTOL) and carrier (CV) JSF variants.
The weight penalty for doubling the internal ordnance capacity of the STOVL JSF is 350lbs for both doors (Killea) .
The tremendous tactical flexibility that doubling the internal bomb bay capacity would bring would more than offset this weight penalty, but what would make it truly tactical significant is its added capability to carry more small diameter bombs. Small diameter bombs are 250lbs precision-guided munitions with the explosive effect of a 1000-lb bomb (Hebert, 3) . Equipped with the larger bomb bay doors, the STOVL JSF will be able to carry six to eight 250-lb SDBs per bomb bay, instead of four with the small doors. By adding only 350lbs to the gross weight to the aircraft it's possible to significantly increase the number of targets the STOVL JSF could service per sortie.
A large bomb bay would also make it much easier for the STOVL JSF to carry its force multiplies, its gun. 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE AVIATION LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
To answer the question of why a 7000 foot runway would be an extremely important to land-basing an aircraft capable of conducting a vertical landing on a ship it is necessary to look the Marine Corps' past and present ability to land base its current STOVL aircraft, the AV-8B
Harrier. "Despite all the propaganda that was put out by Rapid advances in SAM and man portable missile technology will soon make maintaining a JSF's low observable qualities a basic requirement for its ability to provide the type of in-close on-call fires a MAGTF will demand.
SUMMARY
This author firmly believes that the tactical compromises required to field the STOVL JSF, in order to ensure that the MAGTF's possess an organic sea-based fighter attack platform capable of providing combined arms fires in support of future OMFTS operations are warranted.
The Marine Corps must take every step to ensure that the STOVL JSF is designed and fielded in way that regardless of
